A Preferences-based Theory of Audience Costs
Under review.
Audience costs are central to our understanding of international politics. In recent years, however, audience costs have come under attack repeatedly. I offer a new theory of audience costs grounded in the substantive preferences of individuals that 1) subsumes traditional audience costs theory, 2) can account for more variation than existing theories, 3) produces counterintuitive implications, and 4) remains parsimonious. I introduce this theory using a deliberately simple formal model. Then, I show that members of the public and leaders behave as this theory predicts using original survey experiments and a case study of the 1895 Anglo-American Venezuela Crisis. Finally, I test a direct implication in the context of the democratic credibility literature. This preferences-based theory of audience costs consolidates and refines multiple theoretical arguments about the role of public opinion in international crisis bargaining and emphasizes the importance of the distribution of public preferences for leaders’ decision-making process.
The Trilemma of Hegemonic Order Competition
Under review.
Existing theories predict that, as China rises, it will want to reshape the rules-based international order led by the United States. Current debates center on three questions: Will the United States preserve its influence over the international order? Will the future order promote American interests? Finally, will change be peaceful? Unfortunately, scholars largely address only one or two of these questions at a time. The problem is that their answers are logically connected in what, I argue, constitutes the trilemma of order competition. Broadly stated, when powerful states compete over international orders, they are confronted with three desirable, yet jointly unattainable, objectives: 1) to maximize their influence over other states while minimizing the cost of order maintenance; 2) to promote an order that advances a set of interests aligned with their own interests; and 3) to avoid war. The central takeaway is that only two out of these three objectives can be mutually consistent and order-makers must decide which one to give up. I develop a formal model that highlights the strategic nature of order management: powerful states benefit from having states participate in their order, but the more dissimilar members’ preferences are from the order’s purpose, the costlier it is for powerful states to ensure that member states comply with their obligations. Two case studies—the 1895 Venezuela Crisis and the recent 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine—illustrate this trilemma. Counterintuitively, the model implies that the more different the set of interests each order-maker advances, the less likely conflict becomes. I conclude by discussing the practical implications of the trilemma for American foreign policy.
Dynamics of Change in International Organizations
Under review, with Daniel Verdier and Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni.
States face several options when intent on changing an IO: they can reform it or create a successor that assumes all or part of the prior institution’s functions–a practice known as succession. Reform and succession are equally efficient mechanisms of institutional change, yet addressing different negotiating hurdles. While succession allows reformers to sidestep veto players, on whom reform trips, unlike reform, succession suffers from scale suboptimality–not every existing member may join the successor institution. Contingent on which negotiation obstacle prevails, reform is preferred to succession or vice versa. We provide a game-theoretic foundation to this proposition, advance a computational solution, and illustrate with historical examples.
Only Doves Could Send Nixon to China
Working paper.
When do leaders pursue rapprochement? A counterintuitive answer is that “only Nixon could go to China”—that Nixon’s reputation as a foreign policy hawk allowed him to pursue a conciliatory policy with China that the U.S. public would not have tolerated from a more dovish president. This hawkish advantage thesis has been premised on the basis that hawks may appear more moderate and are better able to convey the desirability of conciliation than doves. Scant attention, however, has been devoted to the individual preferences we know voters have regarding foreign policy. Yet, if we are to understand the domestic conditions that favor rapprochement, it is crucial to bring voters back to the fore of our theory. I field an original survey experiment to answer whether hawks always enjoy an advantage when pursuing peace. Experimental results suggest three main points. First, conciliation (belligerence) is most likely when voters are pacific (militant). Second, hawkish advantage dynamics only manifest when voters are militant, but these results imply the existence of an even clear dovish advantage. Indeed, voters reward the belligerence of doves considerably more than that of hawks. However, I do not find any evidence of a hawkish advantage at conciliation when the public is pacific. Finally, I find that preferences also shape how voters perceive leader moderation and policy quality. Overall, these results emphasize the importance of the public’s type for conciliation and suggest important implications for future Sino-American relations.
