Dynamics of Change in International Organizations

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni

Daniel Verdier

Maël van Beek

Abstract

This project investigates how states renegotiate international bargains after unexpected events undermine the initial deal and finds that internal reforms are most likely when powerful and weak states alike desire change. If there is an imbalance, however, and only one group is mobilized for change, then the creation of a new institution becomes more likely as it bypasses the veto of the other group.

Type

Manuscript

Publication

Under review

States face several options when intent on changing an international organization: they can either reform it or create a successor that assumes all or part of the prior organization’s functions–a practice known as institutional succession. Reform and succession are equally efficient mechanisms of institutional change, yet addressing different negotiating hurdles. While succession allows reformers to sidestep veto players on whom reform often trips, unlike reform, succession suffers from scale suboptimality since not every existing member may join the successor institution. Contingent on which negotiation obstacle prevails, reform is preferred to succession or vice versa. We provide a game-theoretic foundation to this proposition, advance a computational solution, and illustrate it with empirical examples.